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Abstract
We show that the Cournot oligopoly game with non-linear market
demand can be reformulated as a best-response potential game where
the best-response potential function is linear-quadratic.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
A recent stream of literature has focussed upon the so-called potential games
(Monderer and Shapley, 1996), using the concept of potential function bor-
rowed from physics. The essential idea behind these concepts is that the
information about Nash equilibria can be nested into a single real-valued
function on the strategy space. In order to clarify the aim of our paper, we
brieﬂy summarize the deﬁnition and properties of potential games.




, where N , (1,2,3,...n)i s
the set of players, Si is the strategy space for player i and πi (s)i st h ep a y o ﬀ
function attributing a payoﬀ to i in correspondence of any given admissible
outcome s. In diﬀerentiable games, where Si is an interval of real numbers
for all i ∈ N, the function P (s)i sa nexact potential function for the game
Γ iﬀ P (s) is continuously diﬀerentiable and ∂πi (s)/∂si = ∂P (s)/∂si for
all i ∈ N (Monderer and Shapley, 1996, Lemma 4.4, p. 134). Additionally,
if the payoﬀ functions are twice continuously diﬀerentiable, Γ is a potential
game iﬀ ∂2πi (s)/∂si∂sj = ∂2πj (s)/∂sj∂si for all i,j ∈ N (Monderer and
Shapley, 1996, Theorem 4.5, p. 135).
The latter property holds, e.g., in the Cournot oligopoly game with linear
market demand, which is therefore an exact potential game (see Slade, 1994,
p. 52; and Monderer and Shapley, 1996, pp. 124-125), while it is not met in
oligopoly models with non-linear demand (see Anderson and Engers, 1992,
inter alia). However, even if ∂2πi (s)/∂si∂sj 6= ∂2πj (s)/∂sj∂si, one can still
show that the game has a best-response potential function b P (s)u n d e ra
milder requirement, namely that
argmax
si∈Si
πi (s)=a r gm a x
si∈Si
b P (s)( 1 )
for all i ∈ N and for all admissible strategy proﬁles s. If b P (s)t a k e sam a x i -




2the game Γ has a Nash equilibrium in s∗. (Voorneveld, 2000, Deﬁnition 2.1
and Proposition 2.2, p. 290).
In the next section, we outline the Cournot oligopoly game with non-linear
market demand (Anderson and Engers, 1992) as a best-response potential
game, showing that it has a linear-quadratic form. This result, which here
w ep r e s e n ta sa ne x a m p l eb a s e do nas t a t ic game, has appealing applications
t od y n a m i cg a m e sw h o s es t r a t e g i cf o r mi snot linear-quadratic and therefore,
in principle, cannot be solved analytically to yield feedback equilibria.
2T h e g a m e
As in Anderson and Engers (1992), we consider a Cournot oligopoly where
n ﬁrms sell a homogeneous good whose market demand function is:
Q =1− p
α ,α>0 . (2)
The above function is always downward sloping, and can be either convex
(α ∈ (0,1)) or concave (α>1). Hence, the inverse demand function is:





i=1 qi, and qi is the individual output of ﬁrm i. Production costs
are normalised to zero. The individual proﬁt function is therefore equal to
πi = pqi.






∀α 6=1 . (4)
Consequently, for all α 6=1 , the Cournot game with non linear demand is
not a potential game. However, we can prove the following:
3Proposition 1 For all α 6=1 , the Cournot game with non linear demand is





















Proof. Essentially, the proof consists in showing that the present Cournot
game meets the conditions formulated by Voorneveld (2000, p. 290). To this


















=0 ( 5 )
is met when α
³




− qi =0 , which yields the equilibrium
quantity qN = α/(1 + αN). The other solution to (5), q =1 /N, can be












as the ﬁctitious ﬁrst order condition of ﬁrm i. Let















− qi (1 + α)
#
(7)
be the corresponding ﬁctitious proﬁtf u n c t i o no fi.
If we take the summation b Π =
Pn


























































is the best-response potential function of the game under examination. Hence,
Cournot oligopolists facing market demand (3) act as if they were jointly
maximising (9).
Therefore, as in the Cournot examples treated by Slade (1994) and Mon-
derer and Shapley (1996), b P is a ﬁctitious objective function whereby the
Cournot model could be reinterpreted as a coordination game where every
player aims at maximising b P.The additional implication of the present non-
linear example is that it opens the way to interesting applications in the ﬁeld
of dynamic games where the strategic form, being not linear-quadratic, pre-
vents from characterising the analytical solution of the feedback equilibrium,
which is instead attainable with the corresponding best-response potential
game in linear-quadratic form.1 This is left for future research.
1The open-loop solution of the diﬀerential Cournot game using (3) and the Ramsey
dynamics is in Cellini and Lambertini (2007).
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